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ABSTRACT
The sensitivity of U.S. aggregate investment to shocks is procyclical: the initial response increases
by approximately 50% from the trough to the peak of the business cycle. This feature of the data follows
naturally from a DSGE model with lumpy microeconomic capital adjustment. Beyond explaining this
specific time variation, our model and evidence provide a counterexample to the claim that microeconomic
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U.S. non-residential private ﬁxed investment exhibits conditional heteroscedasticity. Figure 1
depicts a smooth, nonparametric estimate of the heteroscedasticity of the residual from ﬁtting
an AR(1) process to quarterly aggregate investment rate from 1960 to 2005, as a function of the
average recent investment rate (see Appendix C for details). This ﬁgure shows that investment
is signiﬁcantly more responsive to shocks in times of high investment.1
Figure 1: Conditional Heteroscedasticity






































In this paper we show that this nonlinear feature of the data follows naturally from a DSGE
modelwithlumpymicroeconomicinvestment. Thereasonforconditionalheteroscedasticityin
the model, is that the impulse response function is history dependent, with an initial response
that increases by roughly 50% from the bottom to the peak of the business cycle. In particular,
the longer an expansion, the larger the response of investment to further shocks. Conversely,
investment slumps are hard to recover from.
More broadly, our calibrated model suggests that over the 1960-2005 period the initial re-
sponse of investment to a productivity shock in the top quartile is 32% higher than the average
response in the bottom quartile. Differences go beyond the initial response. The left panel in
Figure 2 depicts the response over time to a one standard deviation shock taking place at se-
lected points of the U.S. investment cycle: the trough in 1961, a period of average investment
activity in 1989 and the peak in 2000.2 The variability of these impulse responses is apparent
1The dotted lines depict §one standard deviation conﬁdence bands.
2The ﬁgure depicts the impulse responses of the aggregate investment rate at each year, normalized by the
average aggregate quarterly investment rate: 0.026.
1Figure 2: Impulse Response in Different Years






























and large. For example, the immediate response to a shock in the trough in 1961 and the peak
in 2000 differ by roughly 50%. The contrast with the right panel of this ﬁgure, which depicts the
impulse responses for a model with no microeconomic frictions in investment (essentially, the
standard RBC model), is evident: For the latter, the impulse responses vary little over time.
Beyond explaining the rich nonlinear dynamics of aggregate investment rates, our model
provides a counterexample to the claim that microeconomic investment lumpiness is inconse-
quential for macroeconomic analysis. This is relevant, since even though Caballero and Engel
(1999) found substantial aggregate nonlinearities in a partial equilibrium model with lumpy
capital adjustment, recent and important methodological contributions by Veracierto (2002),
Thomas (2002) and Khan and Thomas (2003, 2008) have provided examples of situations where
general equilibrium undoes the partial equilibrium features.
Why do we reach such a different conclusion? Because, implicitly, their particular calibra-
tions impose that the bulk of investment dynamics is determined by general equilibrium con-
straints rather than by adjustment costs. Instead, we focus our calibration effort on gauging
the relative importance of these forces, and conclude that both adjustment costs and general
equilibrium forces play a relevant role.
Concretely, the objective in any dynamic macroeconomic model is to trace the impact of
aggregate shocks on aggregate endogenous variables (investment in our context). The typical
response is less than one-for-one upon impact, as a variety of microeconomic frictions and
general equilibrium constraints smooth and spread over time the response of the endogenous
variable. We refer to this process as smoothing, and decompose it into its pre-general equi-
librium (PE) and general equilibrium (GE) components. In the context of nonlinear lumpy-
2adjustment models, PE-smoothing does not refer to the existence of microeconomic inaction
and lumpiness per se, but to the impact these have on aggregate smoothing. This is a key dis-
tinction in this class of models, as in many instances microeconomic inaction translates into
limited aggregate inertia (recall the classic Caplin and Spulber (1987) result, where price-setters
follow Ss rules but the aggregate price level behaves as if there were no microeconomic fric-
tions). In a nutshell, our key difference with the previous literature is that the latter explored
combinations of parameter values that implied microeconomic lumpiness but left almost no
role for PE-smoothing, thereby precluding the possibility of ﬁtting facts such as the conditional
heteroscedasticity of aggregate investment rates depicted in Figure 1.









PE and GE smoothing
(0.0023)
100%
Table 1 illustrates our model’s decomposition into PE- and GE-smoothing. The upper en-
try shows the volatility of aggregate investment rates in our model when neither smoothing
mechanism is present (in other words, when there are no adjustment costs at the microeco-
nomic level and no price adjustments in the economy). The intermediate entries incorporate
PE- and GE-smoothing, one at a time, while the lower entry considers both sources of smooth-
ing simultaneously. The reduction of the quarterly standard deviation of the aggregate invest-
ment rate achieved by PE-smoothing alone amounts to 81.0% of the reduction achieved by the
combinationofbothsmoothingmechanisms. Alternatively,theadditionalsmoothingachieved
by PE-forces, compared with what GE-smoothing achieves by itself, is 15.4% of the smoothing
achieved by both sources.
It is clear that both sources of smoothing do not enter additively, so some care is needed
3whenquantifyingthecontributionofeachsourcetooverallsmoothing. Nonetheless, averaging
the upper and lower bounds mentioned above suggests roughly similar roles for both sources
of smoothing in our model.3 By contrast, as discussed in detail in Section 3, the contribution
of PE-smoothing is very small in the recent literature—typically the upper bound is under 20%
while the lower bound is zero.
Given its centrality in differentiating our answer from that of previous models, our calibra-
tion strategy is designed to capture the role of PE-smoothing as directly as possible. To this ef-
fect, we use sectoral data to calibrate the parameters that control the impact of micro-frictions
onaggregates,beforegeneralequilibriumforceshaveachancetoplayasmoothingrole. Speciﬁ-
cally, we argue that the response of semi-aggregated (e.g., 3-digit) investment to corresponding
sectoral shocks is less subject to general equilibrium forces, and hence serves to identify the
relative importance of PE-smoothing.
Table 2: VOLATILITY AND AGGREGATION
Model 3-digit Aggregate 3-dig. Agg. Ratio
Data 0.0163 0.0098 1.66
This paper: 0.0163 0.0098 1.66
Frictionless: 0.1839 0.0098 18.77
Khan-Thomas (2008): 0.4401 0.0100 44.01
The ﬁrst row in Table 2 shows the observed volatility of annual sectoral and aggregate in-
vestment rates, and their ratio.4 The second row shows the same values for our baseline lumpy
model and the third row does the same for a model with no microeconomic frictions in invest-
ment. The fourth row reports the same statistics for the model in Khan and Thomas (2008),
which we discuss later in the paper. It is apparent from this table that the frictionless model
3The upper and lower bounds for the contribution of PE-smoothing are calculated as follows:
UB Æ log[¾(NONE)/¾(PE)]/log[¾(NONE)/¾(BOTH)],
LB Æ 1¡log[¾(NONE)/¾(GE)]/log[¾(NONE)/¾(BOTH)]
where NONE refers to the pre-general equilibrium model with no microeconomic frictions, PE to the model that
only has microeconomic frictions so that prices are ﬁxed, GE to the model with only GE constraints, and BOTH to
the model with both micro frictions and GE constraints.
4Sectoral investment data are only available at an annual frequency. The numbers in rows two and three come
from the annual analogues of our quarterly baseline models. For details, see Appendices A and B. The volatility
of aggregate investment rates in Table 2 for Kahn and Thomas is taken from table III in Kahn and Thomas (2008).
The volatility of sectoral investment rates is based on our calculations. We add their idiosyncratic shock and our
sectoral shock to compute the total standard deviation for the PE-innovations. The lumpy model in Kahn and
Thomas (2008) exhibits larger sectoral volatility than the frictionless counterpart of our lumpy model because of
parameter differences between our model and theirs, such as the curvature of the revenue function (see details
in section 3). What matters for our purposes is that either one fails to match sectoral volatilities by an order of
magnitude.
4fails to match the sectoral data (it was never designed to do so). In contrast, by reallocating
smoothing from GE- to PE-forces, the lumpy investment model is able to match both aggregate
and sectoral volatility. This pins down our decomposition and is, together with the conditional-
heteroscedasticity feature, the essence of our calibration strategy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present our dy-
namic general equilibrium model. Section 3 discusses the calibration method in detail. Sec-
tions 4 presents the main macroeconomic implications of the model and Section 5 shows the
robustness of the main results. Section 6 concludes and is followed by several appendices.
2 The Model
In this section we describe our model economy. We start with the problem of the production
units, followed by a brief description of the households and the deﬁnition of equilibrium. We
conclude with a sketch of the equilibrium computation. We follow closely Kahn and Thomas
(2008), henceforth KT, both in terms of substance and notation. Aside from parameter differ-
ences, we have three main departures from KT. First, production units face persistent sector-
speciﬁc productivity shocks, in addition to aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. Second, pro-
duction units undertake some within-period maintenance investment which is necessary to
continue operation (there is ﬁxed proportions and some parts and machines that break down
need to be replaced, see, e.g., McGrattan and Schmitz (1999) for evidence on the importance of
maintenance investment). Third, the distribution of aggregate productivity shocks is continu-
ous rather than a Markov discretization.5
2.1 Production Units
The economy consists of a large number of sectors, which are each populated by a continuum
ofproductionunits. Sincewedonotmodelentryandexitdecisions, themassofthesecontinua
is ﬁxed and normalized to one. There is one commodity in the economy that can be consumed
or invested. Each production unit produces this commodity, employing its pre-determined
capital stock (k) and labor (n), according to the following Cobb-Douglas decreasing-returns-




5This allows us to do computations that are not feasible with a Markov discretization. For example, backing out
the aggregate shocks that are fed into the model to produce Figure 3.
5where zt, ²S and ²I denote aggregate, sectoral and unit-speciﬁc (idiosyncratic) productivity
shocks.
We denote the trend growth rate of aggregate productivity by (1¡µ)(°¡1), so that y and k
growatrate°¡1alongthebalancedgrowthpath. Fromnowonweworkwithk and y (andlater
C) in efﬁciency units. The detrended aggregate productivity level, which we also denote by z,




The sectoral and idiosyncratic technology processes follow Markov chains, that are approx-
imations to continuous AR(1) processes with Gaussian innovations.6 The latter have standard
deviations ¾S and ¾I, and autocorrelations ½S and ½I, respectively. Productivity innovations
at different aggregation levels are independent. Also, sectoral productivity shocks are indepen-
dent across sectors and idiosyncratic productivity shocks are independent across productive
units.
Eachperiodaproductionunitdrawsfromatime-invariantdistribution,G,itscurrentcostof
capitaladjustment, »¸0, whichisdenominatedinunitsoflabor. G isauniformdistributionon




productivity, and its capital adjustment cost. Given the aggregate state, it decides its employ-
ment level, n, production occurs, maintenance is carried out, workers are paid, and investment
decisions are made. Then the period ends.
Upon investment the unit incurs a ﬁxed cost of !», where ! is the current real wage rate.
Capital depreciates at a rate ±, but units may ﬁnd it necessary to replace certain items during
the production process.
Deﬁne ¯ Ã ´
°
1¡± È 1 as the maintenance investment rate needed to fully compensate depre-
ciation and trend growth. The degree of necessary maintenance, Â, can then be conveniently
deﬁned as a fraction of ¯ Ã. If ÂÆ0, no maintenance investment is needed; if ÂÆ1, all deprecia-
tionandtrendgrowthmustbeundoneforaproductionunittocontinueoperation. Wecannow
summarize the evolution of the unit’s capital stock (in efﬁciency units) between two consecu-
tive periods, from k to k0, after non-maintenance investment i and maintenance investment
iM ÆÂ(°¡1Å±)k take place, as follows:
6We use the discretization in Tauchen (1986), see Appendix D for details.
6Fixed cost paid °k0






If ÂÆ0, then k0 Æ(1¡±)k/°, while k0 Æk if ÂÆ100%. We treat Â as a primitive parameter.7
NoticethatÂisobviouslyirrelevantfortheunitsthatactuallyadjustattheendoftheperiod.
This is not to say that these units do not have to spend on maintenance within the production
period, but rather their net capital growth, conditional on incurring the ﬁxed cost and opti-
mal adjustment, is independent of this expenditure. This is essentially a feature of only having
ﬁxed adjustment costs, as opposed to more general adjustment technologies that also include
a component that depends on the magnitude of capital adjustments.
Given the i.i.d. nature of the adjustment costs, it is sufﬁcient to describe differences across
production units and their evolution by the distribution of units over (²S,²I,k). We denote this
distribution by ¹. Thus, (z,¹) constitutes the current aggregate state and ¹ evolves according to
the law of motion ¹0 Æ¡(z,¹), which production units take as given.
Next we describe the dynamic programming problem of each production unit. We will take
two shortcuts (details can be found in KT). First, we state the problem in terms of utils of the
representative household (rather than physical units), and denote by p Æ p(z,¹) the marginal
utility of consumption. This is the relative intertemporal price faced by a production unit. Sec-
ond, given the i.i.d. nature of the adjustment costs, continuation values can be expressed with-
out explicitly taking into account future adjustment costs.
It will simplify notation to deﬁne an additional parameter, Ã2[1, ¯ Ã]:
ÃÆ1Å( ¯ Ã¡1)Â, (3)
and write maintenance investment as:8
iM Æ(Ã¡1)(1¡±)k. (4)
Let V 1(²S,²I,k,»;z,¹) denote the expected discounted value—in utils—of a unit that is in
idiosyncratic state (²I,k,»), and is in a sector with sectoral productivity ²S, given the aggregate
state(z,¹). Thentheexpectedvaluepriortotherealizationoftheadjustmentcostdrawisgiven
7We note that our version of maintenance investment differs from what KT call “constrained investment”. Here,
maintenance refers to the replacement of parts and machines without which production cannot continue, while
in KT it is an extra margin of adjustment for small investment projects.












where CF denotes the ﬁrm’s ﬂow value, Vi the ﬁrm’s continuation value if it chooses inaction
and does not adjust, and Va the continuation value, net of adjustment costs AC, if the ﬁrm









where both expectation operators average over next period’s realizations of the aggregate, sec-
toral and idiosyncratic shocks, conditional on this period’s values, and we recall that iM Æ
(Ã¡1)(1¡±)k and i Æ °k0 ¡(1¡±)k ¡iM. Also, ¯ denotes the discount factor from the rep-
resentative household.
Taking as given intra- and intertemporal prices !(z,¹) and p(z,¹), and the law of motion
¹0 Æ ¡(z,¹), the production unit chooses optimally labor demand, whether to adjust its capital
stock at the end of the period, and the optimal capital stock, conditional on adjustment. This
leads to policy functions: N Æ N(²S,²I,k;z,¹) and K Æ K(²S,²I,k,»;z,¹). Since capital is pre-
determined, the optimal employment decision is independent of the current adjustment cost
draw.
2.2 Households
We assume a continuum of identical households that have access to a complete set of state-
contingent claims. Hence, there is no heterogeneity across households. Moreover, they own
shares in the production units and are paid dividends. We do not need to model the house-
hold side explicitly (see KT for details), and concentrate instead on the ﬁrst-order conditions to
determine the equilibrium wage and the intertemporal price.
8Households have a standard felicity function in consumption and (indivisible) labor:
U(C,Nh)ÆlogC ¡ ANh, (8)
where C denotes consumption and Nh the fraction of household members that work. House-





















1. Production unit optimality: Taking !, p and ¡ as given,V 1(²S,²I,k;z,¹) solves (6) and the
corresponding policy functions are N(²S,²I,k;z,¹) and K(²S,²I,k,»;z,¹).
2. Household optimality: Taking ! and p as given, the household’s consumption and labor
supply satisfy (8) and (9).




Z Z ¯ »
0
[°K(²S,²I,k,»;z,¹)¡(1¡±)k]dGd¹.











where J(x)Æ0, if x Æ0 and 1, otherwise.
95. Modelconsistentdynamics: Theevolutionofthecross-sectionthatcharacterizestheecon-
omy, ¹0 Æ ¡(z,¹), is induced by K(²S,²I,k,»;z,¹) and the exogenous processes for z, ²S
and ²I.
Conditions1, 2, 3and4deﬁneanequilibriumgiven¡, whilestep5speciﬁestheequilibrium
condition for ¡.
2.4 Solution
As is well-known, (6) is not computable, since ¹ is inﬁnite dimensional. Hence, we follow
Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998) and approximate the distribution ¹ by its ﬁrst moment over
capital, and its evolution, ¡, by a simple log-linear rule. In the same vein, we approximate the
equilibrium pricing function by a log-linear rule:
log ¯ k0 Æak Åbk log ¯ k Åck logz, (11a)
logp Æap Åbp log ¯ k Åcp logz, (11b)
where ¯ k denotes aggregate capital holdings. Given (10), we do not have to specify an equilib-
rium rule for the real wage. As usual with this procedure, we posit this form and verify that in
equilibrium it yields a good ﬁt to the actual law of motion (see Appendix D for details).
To implement the computation of sectoral investment rates, we simplify the problem fur-
ther and impose two additional assumptions: 1) ½S Æ½I Æ½ and 2) enough sectors, so that sec-
toralshockshavenoaggregateeffects. Bothassumptionscombinedallowustoreducethestate





the production unit cannot use it to extract any more information about the future than it has
already from the combined technology level. Finally, it is this combined productivity level that
is discretized into a 19-state Markov chain. The second assumption allows us to compute the
sectoral problem independently of the aggregate general equilibrium problem.9
Combining these assumptions and substituting ¯ k for ¹ into (6) and using (11a)–(11b), we
9In Appendix D.3 we show that our results are robust to this simplifying assumption.
10have that (7a)–(7d) become
CFÆ[z²kµnº¡!(z, ¯ k)n¡iM]p(z, ¯ k), (12a)
Vi Æ¯E[V 0(²0,Ã(1¡±)k/°;z0, ¯ k0)], (12b)
AC Æ»!(z, ¯ k)p(z, ¯ k), (12c)
Va Æ¡ip(z, ¯ k)Å¯E[V 0(²0,k0;z0, ¯ k0)]. (12d)
With the above expressions, (6) becomes a computable dynamic programming problem with
policyfunctionsN Æ N(²,k;z, ¯ k)andK ÆK(²,k,»;z, ¯ k). Wesolvethisproblemviavaluefunction
iteration on V 0 and Gauss-Hermitian numerical integration over log(z) (see Appendix D for
details).
Several features facilitate the solution of the model. First, as mentioned above, the employ-
ment decision is static. In particular it is independent of the investment decision at the end of








Next we comment on the computation of the production unit’s decision rules and value
function, given the equilibrium pricing and movement rules (11a)–(11b). From (12d) it is obvi-
ous that neither Va nor the optimal target capital level, conditional on adjustment, depend on
current capital holdings. This reduces the number of optimization problems in the value func-
tion iteration considerably. Comparing (12d) with (12b) shows that Va(²;z, ¯ k) ¸ Vi(²,k;z, ¯ k).10
It follows that there exists an adjustment cost factor that makes a production unit indifferent
between adjusting and not adjusting:
ˆ »(²,k;z, ¯ k)Æ
Va(²;z, ¯ k)¡Vi(²,k;z, ¯ k)
!(z, ¯ k)p(z, ¯ k)
¸0. (14)
We deﬁne »T(²,k;z, ¯ k) ´ min
¡¯ », ˆ »(²,k;z, ¯ k)
¢
. Production units with » · »T(²,k;z, ¯ k) will adjust
their capital stock. Thus,




k¤(²;z, ¯ k) if »·»T(²,k;z, ¯ k),
Ã(1¡±)k/° otherwise.
(15)
10The production unit can always choose i Æ0 and thus k¤ ÆÃ(1¡±)k/°.
11We deﬁne mandated investment for a unit with current state (²,z, ¯ k) and current capital k as:
Mandated investment ´ log°k¤(²;z, ¯ k) ¡ logÃ(1¡±)k.
That is, mandated investment is the investment rate the unit would undertake, after maintain-
ing its capital, if its current adjustment cost draw were equal to zero.
Now we turn to the second step of the computational procedure takes the value function
V 0(²,k;z, ¯ k) as given, and pre-speciﬁes a randomly drawn sequence of aggregate technology
levels: {zt}. We start from an arbitrary distribution ¹0, implying a value ¯ k0. We then recom-
pute (6), using (12a)–(12d), at every point along the sequence {zt}, and the implied sequence of
aggregate capital levels {¯ kt}, without imposing the equilibrium pricing rule (11a):










¡»A¡ip Å¯E[V 0(²0,k0;z0, ¯ k0(kt))]
¢o¾
,
with Vi deﬁned in (7b) and evaluated at ¯ k0 Æ ¯ k0(kt). This yields new “policy functions”
˜ N Æ ˜ N(²,k;zt, ¯ kt,p)
˜ K Æ ˜ K(²,k,»;zt, ¯ kt,p).
We then search for a p such that, given these new decision rules and after aggregation, the
goods market clears (labor market clearing is trivially satisﬁed). We then use this p to ﬁnd the
new aggregate capital level.
This procedure generates a time series of {pt} and {¯ kt} endogenously, with which assumed
rules (11a)–(11b) can be updated via a simple OLS regression. The procedure stops when the
updated coefﬁcients ak, bk, ck and ap, bp, cp are sufﬁciently close to the previous ones. We
show in Appendix D that the implied R2 of these regressions are high for all model speciﬁca-
tions, generally well above 0.99, indicating that production units do not make large mistakes by
using the rules (11a)–(11b). This is conﬁrmed by the fact that adding higher moments of the
capital distribution does not increase forecasting performance signiﬁcantly.
3 Calibration
Ourcalibrationstrategyandparametersarestandardwithtwoadditionalfeatures: Wecombine
sectoral and aggregate data in order to infer the decomposition of PE- and GE-smoothing, and
we calibrate the conditional heteroscedasticity of investment in U.S. data.
123.1 Calibration Strategy
The model period for the baseline model is a quarter. The following parameters have standard
values: ¯ Æ 0.9942, ° Æ 0.004, º Æ 0.64, and ½A Æ 0.95. The log-felicity function features an
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) of one. The depreciation rate ± is picked to match
the average quarterly investment rate in the data: 0.026, which leads to ±Æ0.022. The disutility
of work parameter, A, is chosen to generate an employment rate of 0.6.
Next we explain our choices for µ, ¾A and the parameters of the sectoral and idiosyncratic
technology process (½S, ¾S, ½I and ¾I). This is followed by a detailed discussion of how we
calibrate the adjustment cost parameter, ¯ », and the maintenance parameter, Â, which are at the
heart of our calibration strategy.
The output elasticity of capital, µ, is set to 0.18, in order to capture a revenue elasticity of
capital, µ
1¡º, equal to 0.5, while keeping the labor share at its 0.64-value.11 For comparability in
the second moments, ¾A is picked to make both the lumpy and the frictionless models match
the volatility of the quarterly aggregate investment rate (0.0023) perfectly.12
We determine ¾S and ½S by a standard Solow residual calculation on annual 3-digit man-
ufacturing data, taking into account sector-speciﬁc trends and time aggregation (see Appen-
dices A and B for details). ¾S equals 0.0273 and ½S 0.8612. For computational feasibility we set
½I Æ ½S, and ¾I to 0.0472, which makes the annual total standard deviation of sectoral and id-
iosyncratic shocks 0.10. We turn now to the calibration of the two key parameters of the model,
¯ » and Â.
With the availability of new and more detailed establishment level data, researchers have
calibrated adjustment costs by matching establishment level moments (see, e.g., KT). This is a
promising strategy in many instances, however, there are two sources of concern in the context
ofthispaper’sobjectives. First,onemusttakeastanceregardingthenumberofproductiveunits
in the model that correspond to one productive unit in the available micro data. Some authors
(e.g., KT) assume that this correspondence is one-to-one, while other authors (e.g., Abel and
Eberly (2002) and Bloom (2007)) match a large number—a continuum and 250, respectively—
of model-micro-units to one observed productive unit (ﬁrm or establishment).
Second, in state dependent models the frequency of microeconomic adjustment is not suf-
ﬁcient to pin down the object of primary concern, which is the aggregate impact of adjust-
ment costs. Parameter changes in other parts of the model can have a substantial effect on this
11Inaworldwithconstantreturnstoscaleandimperfectcompetitionthisamountstoamarkupofapproximately
22%. The curvature of our production function lies between the values considered by KT and Gourio and Kashyap
(2007).
12See Appendix A for the values. For annual calibrations, we target 0.0098 as the volatility of the aggregate invest-
ment rate.
13statistic, even in partial equilibrium. For example, anything that changes the drift of mandated
investment (such as maintenance investment), changes the mapping from microeconomic ad-
justment costs to aggregate dynamics. Caplin and Spulber (1987) provide an extreme example
of this phenomenon, where aggregate behavior is totally unrelated to microeconomic adjust-
ment costs.13
Because of these concerns, we follow an alternative approach where we use 3-digit sectoral
rather than plant level data to calibrate adjustment costs. More precisely, given a value of Â,
we choose ¯ » to match the volatility of sectoral U.S. investment rates. Having done this, we
choose ¾A to match the volatility of the aggregate U.S. investment rate. In this approach we
assume that the sectors we consider are sufﬁciently disaggregated so that general equilibrium
effects can be ignored while, at the same time, there are enough micro units in them to justify
the computational simpliﬁcations that can be made with a large number of units. Hence the
choice of the 3-digit level.
Given a set of parameters, the sequence of sectoral investment rates is generated as follows:
the units’ optimal policies are determined as described in Section 2.4, working in general equi-
librium. Next, starting at the steady state, the economy is subjected to a sequence of sectoral
shocks. Since sectoral shocks are assumed to have no aggregate effects and ½I Æ½S, productive
units perceive them as part of their idiosyncratic shock and use their optimal policies with a
value of one for the aggregate shock and a value equal to the product of the sectoral and id-
iosyncratic shock—i.e. log(²)Ælog(²S)Ålog(²I)—for the idiosyncratic shock.14
The value of sectoral volatility of annual investment rates we match is 0.0163.15 As noted in
the introduction, this number is one order of magnitude smaller than the one predicted by the
frictionless model.
Finally, we calibrate the maintenance parameter Â by matching the logarithm of the ratio
betweenthemaximumandminimumoftheestimatedvaluesfortheconditionalheteroscedas-
ticity; we refer to this statistic as the heteroscedasticity range in what follows. That is, given a
quarterly series of aggregate investment rates, xt, the moment we match is obtained by ﬁrst
regressing the series on its lagged value and then regressing the absolute residual from this re-
13In Appendix E we present a simple extension of the paper’s main model, to show how by adding two micro
parameters with no macroeconomic or sectoral consequences one can obtain a very good ﬁt of observed micro
moments. The problems of matching micro moments and matching aggregate moments are orthogonal in this
extension.
14Appendix D.3 describes the details of the sectoral computation. There we also document a robustness exer-
cise where we relax the assumption that sectoral shocks have no general equilibrium effects, and recompute the
optimal policies when micro units consider the distribution of sectoral productivity shocks—summarized by its
mean—as an additional state variable. Our main results are essentially unchanged by this extension.
15We time-aggregate the quarterly investment rates generated by the model to obtain this number. For details,
on how we compute this number on the data, see Appendix B.2.
14gression, jˆ etj, on xt¡1 (both regressions are estimated via OLS):
jˆ etjÆ ˆ ®0Å ˆ ®1xt¡1Åerror. (16)
Denoting by ¾max and ¾min the largest and smallest ﬁtted values from the regression in (16), the
heteroscedasticity range is equal to §log(¾max/¾min), with a positive sign when the maximum
lies to the right of the minimum and a negative sign otherwise. The target value for the het-
eroscedasticity range in the data is 0.3971, which implies a variation in the initial response to
shocks that increases by approximately 50% from the trough to the peak of the business cycle
(e0.3971 '1.49). Of course, when simulating our model to calculate the average heteroscedastic-
ity range for given parameter values, the length of the simulated series is equal to the length of
the actual data (184 quarterly observations).
3.2 Calibration Results
Theupperboundoftheadjustmentcostdistribution, ¯ »,andthemaintenanceparameter,Â,that
jointly match the sectoral investment volatility and the conditional heteroscedasticity statistic
are ¯ » Æ 8.8 and Â Æ 0.50, respectively. The average cost actually paid is much lower, as shown
in Table 3, since productive units wait for good draws to adjust. Conditional on adjusting, a
production unit pays 9.53% of its quarterly output (column 3) or, equivalently, 14.88% of its
regular wage bill (column 4). To be able to compare these ﬁndings with the annual adjustment
cost estimates in the literature, we also report these numbers for an annual analogue of the
quarterly model. With 3.60% and 5.62%, respectively, they appear to be at the lower end of
the literature (see Caballero and Engel (1999), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) as well as Bloom
(2007)). Theﬁrsttwocolumnsreporttheaggregateresourcesspentonadjustment, asafraction
of aggregate output and aggregate investment, respectively.
Table 3: THE ECONOMIC MAGNITUDE OF ADJUSTMENT COSTS
Model Tot. adj. costs/ Tot. adj. costs/ Adj. costs/ Adj. costs/
Aggr. Output Aggr. Investment Unit Output Unit Wage Bill
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lumpy quarterly: 0.35% 2.41% 9.53% 14.88%
Lumpy annual: 0.41% 2.84% 3.60% 5.62%
The ﬁrst two rows of Table 2 in the introduction and Table 4 below show that our model ﬁts
boththesectoralandaggregatevolatilityofinvestment, aswellasthedegreeofconditionalhet-
15eroskedasticity in aggregate data. In contrast, the bottom two rows in each of these tables show
that neither the frictionless counterpart of our model nor the KT model match these features of
the data.







cost. Tables 5 and 6 make this point. The former reports upper and lower bounds for the con-
tribution of PE-smoothing to total smoothing, for several models, at different frequencies. The
main message can be gathered from the ﬁrst two rows of these tables. In Table 5 we see that by
changing the adjustment cost distribution in KT’s model for ours,16 its ability to generate sub-
stantial PE-smoothing rises signiﬁcantly. Conversely, introducing KT adjustment costs into an
annual version of our lumpy model with zero maintenance (third row) leads to a similarly small
role of PE-smoothing as in their model. Rows four to seven show the much larger role for PE-
smoothing under our calibration strategy, robustly for annual and quarterly calibrations and
low and high values of the maintenance parameters. Table 6 shows the economic magnitudes
of the different assumptions on adjustment costs.
Table 5: SMOOTHING DECOMPOSITION: KT
Model PE/total smoothing
Lower bd. Upper bd. Avge.
KT-Lumpy annual (ECMA 2008): 0.0% 16.1% 8.0%
KT-Lumpy annual, our ¯ »: 8.1% 59.2% 33.7%
Our model annual (0% maint.), KT’s ¯ »: 0.8% 16.0% 8.4%
Our model annual (0% maint.): 18.9% 75.3% 47.0%
Our model annual (50% maint.): 20.0% 76.7% 48.3%
Our model quarterly (0% maint.): 14.5% 80.9% 47.7%
Our model quarterly (50% maint.): 15.4% 81.0% 48.2%
16Since KT measure labor in time units (and therefore calibrate to a steady state value of 0.3), and we measure
labor in employment units, the steady state value of which is 0.6, and adjustment costs in both cases are measured
in labor units, we actually use half of our calibrated adjustment cost parameter. Conversely, when we insert KT
adjustment costs into our model, we double it.
16Table 6: THE ECONOMIC MAGNITUDE OF ADJUSTMENT COSTS: KT
Model Tot. adj. costs/ Tot. adj. costs/ Adj. costs/ Adj. costs/
Aggr. Output Aggr. Investment Unit Output Unit Wage Bill
KT-Lumpy annual: 0.22% 1.13% 0.50% 0.77%
Our model annual (0% maint.): 1.80% 12.86% 38.95% 60.86%
Our model annual (50% maint.): 0.41% 2.84% 3.60% 5.62%
Our model quarterly (0% maint.): 1.49% 10.50% 97.08% 151.69%
Our model quarterly (50% maint.): 0.35% 2.41% 9.53% 14.88%
3.3 Conventional RBC Moments
Beforeturningtothespeciﬁcaggregateimplicationsandmechanismsofmicroeconomiclumpi-
ness that are behind the empirical success of our model, we show that these gains do not come
at the cost of sacriﬁcing conventional RBC-moment-matching. Tables 7 and 8 report standard
longitudinal second moments for both the lumpy model and its frictionless counterpart. We
also include a model with no idiosyncratic shocks and the higher revenue elasticity of KT (we
label it RBC). As with all models, the volatility of aggregate productivity shocks is chosen so as
to match the volatility of the aggregate investment rate.17
Table 7: VOLATILITY OF AGGREGATES IN PER CENT
Model Y C I N
Lumpy: 1.34 0.83 4.34 0.56
Frictionless: 1.11 0.44 5.39 0.73
RBC: 1.35 0.45 5.03 0.97
Data: 1.36 0.94 4.87 1.27
Overall, the second moments of the lumpy model are reasonable and comparable to those
of the frictionless models. While the former exacerbates the inability of RBC models to match
the volatility of employment (we use data from the establishment survey on total employment
from the BLS), the lumpy model improves signiﬁcantly when matching the volatility of con-
sumption.18 Italsoincreasesslightlythepersistenceofmostaggregatevariables,bringingthese
statistics closer to their values in the data.
17The value of ¾A required for the RBC model is 0.0058. For the lumpy model, the employment statistics are
computed from total employment, that is including those workers who work on adjusting the capital stock. We
work with all variables in logs and detrend then with an HP-ﬁlter using a bandwidth of 1600.
18Consistent with our model, we deﬁne aggregate consumption as consumption of nondurables and service mi-
nus housing services. Also, we deﬁne output as the sum of this consumption aggregate and aggregate investment.
17Table 8: PERSISTENCE OF AGGREGATES
Model Y C I N I/K
Lumpy: 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.92
Frictionless: 0.69 0.79 0.67 0.67 0.86
RBC: 0.70 0.80 0.68 0.68 0.92
Data: 0.91 0.87 0.91 0.90 0.96
4 Aggregate Investment Dynamics
In this section we describe the mechanism behind our model’s ability to match the conditional
heteroscedasticity of aggregate investment rates. In particular, we show that lumpy adjustment
models generate history dependent aggregate impulse responses.
Figure 3: Time Paths of the Responsiveness Index














































Figure 3 plots the evolution of the quarterly responsiveness index deﬁned in Caballero and
Engel (1993b) for the 1960-2005 period (in percentage deviations from its “steady state” value).
The solid and dashed lines represent the index for the lumpy and frictionless models, respec-
tively, while the vertical lines denote NBER business cycle dates.19 This index captures the re-
sponse upon impact of the aggregate investment rate to an innovation. At each point in time,
this index is calculated conditional on the history of shocks, summarized by the current dis-
19Weusetheterm“steadystate”torefertotheergodic(time-average)distribution,whichwecalculateasfollows:
starting from an arbitrary capital distribution and the ergodic distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks, we simulate
the development of an economy with zero aggregate innovations for 300 periods, but using the policy functions
under the assumption of an economy subject to aggregate shocks.
18tribution of capital across units (see Appendix F for the formal deﬁnition). That is, the index
corresponds to the ﬁrst element of the impulse response conditional on the cross-section of
capital in the given year. The shocks fed into the model are those that allow us to match actual
aggregate quarterly investment rates over the sample period. We initialize the process with the
economy at its steady state in the fourth quarter of 1959.
The ﬁgure conﬁrms the statement in the introduction according to which the initial re-
sponse to an aggregate shock varies signiﬁcantly over time, as does the responsiveness index
which takes values between 0.0161 and 0.0243; this means the responsiveness of the economy
differs by 51% between trough and peak. By contrast, the frictionless model’s responsiveness
index and impulse responses exhibit very little variation: they vary by only 12% between trough
and peak.
To explain how lumpy adjustment models generate time-varying impulse responses, we
consider a particular sample path that is roughly designed to mimic the boom-bust investment
episode in the U.S. during the last decade. For this, we simulate the paths ofthe frictionless and
lumpy economies that result from a sequence of twenty consecutive positive aggregate pro-
ductivity innovations half the size of the respective model’s standard deviation, followed by a
long period where the innovations are equal to zero. The peak investment rate in the path of
the lumpy model is 2.96%, compared to 3.09% in the data. Both economies start from their
respective steady states.
Figure 4: The Aggregate Investment Rate in a Boom-Bust Episode

















































Figure 4 shows the evolution of the aggregate investment rates (as log-deviation from their
19steady state values) for both economies. There are important difference between them: While
at the outset of the boom phase their values are similar, eventually the investment rate in the
lumpy economy reacts by more than the frictionless economy to further positive shocks. The
ﬂip side of the lumpy economy’s larger boom is a more protracted decline in investment during
the bust phase. Let us discuss these two phases in turn.
Figure 5: The Responsiveness Index in a Boom-Bust Episode













































both for the lumpy model and for the frictionless model. Note ﬁrst that the index ﬂuctuates
much less in the frictionless economy than in the lumpy economy. Recall also that the friction-
less economy only has general equilibrium forces to move this index around. From these two
observations we can conjecture that the contribution of the general equilibrium forces to the
volatility of the index in the lumpy economy is minor.
It follows from this ﬁgure that it is the decline in the strength of the PE-smoothing mecha-
nism that is responsible for the rise in the index during the boom phase. When this mechanism
is weakened, the index of responsiveness in the lumpy economy exceeds that of the frictionless
economy, which explains the larger investment boom observed in the lumpy economy after a
history of positive shocks.
Figure 6 illustrates why the PE-smoothing mechanism weakens as the boom progresses. It
shows the cross-section of mandated investment (and the probability of adjusting, conditional
on mandated investment) at three points in time: the beginning of the episode with the econ-
omy at its steady state (solid line), the peak of the boom (dashed line) and the trough of the
20Figure 6: Investment Boom-Bust Episode: Cross-section and Hazard





























cycle (doted line).20 It is apparent from this ﬁgure that during the boom the cross-section of
mandated investment moves toward regions where the probability of adjustment is higher and
steeper. The fraction of micro units with mandated investment close to zero decreases consid-
erably during the boom, while the fraction of units with mandated investment rates above 40%
increasessigniﬁcantly. Also notethatthe fractionofunits inthe regionwhere mandated invest-
ment is negative decreases during the boom, since the sequence of positive shocks moves units
away from this region.
The convex curves in Figure 6 depict the state-dependent adjustment hazard; that is, the
probability of adjusting conditional on the corresponding value of mandated investment. It is
clear that the probability of adjusting increases with the (absolute) value of mandated invest-
ment. This is the ‘increasing hazard property’ described in Caballero and Engel (1993a). The
convexity of the estimated state-dependent adjustment hazards implies that the probability
that a shock induces a micro unit to adjust is larger for units with larger values of mandated
investment. Since units move into the region with a higher slope of the adjustment hazard
during the boom, aggregate investment becomes more responsive. This effect is further com-
pounded by the fact that the adjustment hazard shifts upward as the boom proceeds, although
20See Section 2.4 for the formal deﬁnition of mandated investment. Also note that the scale on the left of the
ﬁgure is for the mandated investment densities, while the scale on the right is for the adjustment hazards.
21this mechanism is small.
In summary, the decline in the strength of PE-smoothing during the boom (and hence the
larger response to shocks) results mainly from the rise in the share of agents that adjust to fur-
ther shocks. This is in contrast with the frictionless (and Calvo style models) where the only
margin of adjustment is the average size of these adjustments. This is shown in Figure 7, which
decomposes the responsiveness index into two components: one that reﬂects the response of
the fraction of adjusters (the extensive margin) and another that captures the response of av-
erage adjustments of those who adjust (the intensive margin). It is apparent that most of the
change in the responsiveness index is accounted for by variations in the fraction of adjusters,
that is, by the extensive margin.
Figure 7: Decomposition of Responsiveness Index: Intensive and Extensive Margins











RI due to Fraction of Lumpy Investors
RI due to Average Lumpy Investment Rate
The importance of ﬂuctuations in the fraction of adjusters is also apparent in the decompo-
sition of the path of the aggregate investment rate into the contributions from the ﬂuctuation
of the fraction of adjusters and the ﬂuctuation of the average size of adjustments, as shown
in Figure 8. Both series are in log-deviations from their steady state values. This is consistent
with what Doms and Dunne (1998) documented for establishment level investment in the U.S.,
where the fraction of units undergoing major investment episodes accounts for a much higher
share of aggregate (manufacturing in their case) investment than the average size of their in-
vestment.
22Figure 8: Decomposition of I/K into Intensive and Extensive Margins









































Fraction of Lumpy Adjusters









































Average Lumpy Investment Rate
Figure 9: Aggregate Capital















































23Let us now turn to the bust phase. Figure 9 illustrates the “overaccumulation” of capital
resulting from the large investment boom in the lumpy economy. As a result of this boom,
once the positive shocks subside, the economy experiences an “overhang” that leads to the
protracted investment slump shown in Figure 4 and the sharp drop in the responsiveness index
shown in Figure 5.
Figure 10: Impulse Responses of the Aggregate Investment Rate at the Trough












The observed slump in the responsiveness index has important implications for the econ-
omy’s ability to return to its steady state investment rate, as the latter becomes unresponsive
to positive stimuli, such as a positive aggregate shock or policy intervention (e.g., an invest-
ment tax credit). Figure 10 illustrates this mechanism by plotting the impulse responses of the
frictionless and lumpy economies following a positive aggregate shock that takes place at their
respective troughs.21 The more sluggish response of investment in the lumpy economy is ap-
parent.
As shown in Figure 3 at the beginning of this section, the insights we obtained from our
study of the boom-bust episode apply more generally. On average, investment responds more
to aggregate shocks after a sequence of above-average shocks, than after a sequence of below-
average shocks. The response to a sequence of average shocks, which corresponds to the stan-
dardimpulseresponsefunctioncalculatedfor alinearmodel, isinbetweenbothcasesandfails
to capture the signiﬁcant time-variation of the impulse responses in our model.
21These impulse responses are plotted in deviations from the paths without the new shock and normalized by
the data’s average aggregate quarterly investment rate.
245 Robustness
Our calibration exercise yields a relatively large maintenance coefﬁcient, ÂÆ0.5, while the lim-
ited evidence available suggests values somewhere between 0.25 and 0.40.22 In this section we
show that allowing for larger values of the EIS yields smaller values for the maintenance param-
eter. We also show that even when the maintenance parameter is set to zero, the model exhibits
substantially more conditional heteroscedasticity than a frictionless model.
5.1 High Elasticity of Substitution
Here we consider an alternative calibration to the one we used for the baseline model. We ﬁx
the standard deviation of aggregate shocks at the level that is required for the frictionless model
to match the observed quarterly aggregate investment volatility in U.S. data (¾A Æ 0.0051) and
insteadusetheEIStocalibratequarterlyaggregateinvestmentvolatility. Thenthemaintenance
parameter is again chosen to match the heteroscedasticity range described in Section 3.1. This
procedure yields a high value of 20 for the EIS, which is better interpreted as a reduced form
parameter for the elasticity of supply of capital faced by the country rather than the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution. That is, the EIS in this model is best viewed as a reduced form
parameter that measures the strength of GE-smoothing relative to PE-smoothing, where the
latter is calibrated directly by ¯ ».23 We also report results we obtain when we apply the cali-
bration strategy described in Section 3.1 with a value of 2 for the EIS; Gruber (2006) obtained
this estimate using careful identiﬁcation based on individual tax data. Table 9 reports the main
parameters and moments associated to these calibrations.
The main point to highlight is that our alternative calibration strategy cuts the estimated
maintenance parameter in half, from 0.50 to 0.25; using the same calibration strategy with an
EIS of 2 also lowers the maintenance parameter, to a value of 0.4. The nonlinearities associated
with conditional heteroscedasticity are now reached at a lower level of maintenance. This, in
turn, raises the magnitude of both calibrated (¯ ») and realized adjustment costs (rows three to
22Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) ﬁnd the mode in the distribution of annual establishment level investment
rates at 0.04. With an effective annual drift of 0.104, this suggests a maintenance parameter just below 40%. Al-
ternatively, McGrattan and Schmitz (1999) show for Canadian data that maintenance and repair expenditures for
equipment and structures amounts to roughly 30% of expenditures on new equipment and structures. This sug-
gests just below 25% maintenance as a fraction of overall investment.
23To implement this calibration strategy, we consider the following family of felicity functions: 1
1¡¾cC1¡¾c ¡
X 1¡¾c ANh, where ¾c is the inverse of the EIS and X the trend level of aggregate technology. The latter feature
guarantees the existence of balanced growth. In a static setting this is easy to see: employment depends on the
wage in efﬁciency units only and the latter is constant under balanced growth. Obviously, if ¾c Æ1, we are back to
a standard log-felicity speciﬁcation. Finally, the discount factor, ¯´¯¤°(1¡¾c) should be interpreted as an effective
discount factor, whose value is kept constant across calibrations, so that ¯¤ is a preference parameter that changes
with ¾c.
25Table 9: HIGH EIS
Â ¯ » Total Adj. Costs/ Total Adj. Costs/ Adj. Costs/ Adj. Costs/
Aggr. Output Aggr. Investment Unit Ourput Unit Wage Bill
EIS = 20: 0.25 27.5 0.80 5.51 33.1% 18.2%
EIS = 2: 0.40 14.3 0.50 3.46 51.7% 25.4%
¾(Y ) ¾(C) ¾(I) ¾(N) ½(Y ) ½(C) ½(I) ½(N) ½(I/K)
EIS = 20: 1.69 1.25 4.36 1.68 0.71 0.72 0.70 0.71 0.93
EIS = 2: 1.55 1.08 4.35 1.06 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.92
six).24 Notice, however, that this rise is not due to the increase in the EIS per se — in fact,
adjustment cost statistics are largely unresponsive to changes in the EIS —, it is the change of
the maintenance parameter that causes the rise. The corresponding values for a model with
high EIS but a maintenance parameters of 0.5 are: 0.35%, 2.41%, 9.56% and 14.93%, which are
very close to the baseline scenario. For the longitudinal second moments, persistence is almost
unchanged with respect to the baseline model, but the volatilities of output, consumption and
employment have increased substantially.









PE and GE smoothing
(0.0023/0.0023)
100%/100%
In this variation of the model the relative importance of PE-smoothing raises over that of
24The values for rows three to six from an equivalent annual calibration are: 0.96%, 6.70%, 12.67% and 19.80%,
which are still very much in line with estimates from the literature.
26GE-smoothing. This is apparent in Table 10 (which reports the EIS=20 numbers followed by
the EIS=2 numbers). Compared to the baseline scenario, the upper and lower bounds for PE-
smoothing increase from 81.0% to 95.0% and 15.4 to 42.7%, respectively, for the high EIS case.
The average of both bounds is now close to 70%, compared to approximately 50% for the orig-
inal model. Finally, Figure 11 shows that the paths of the ﬁrst element of the impulse response
function are nearly identical for the main calibration and the model obtained with the alterna-
tive calibration strategy of this section.
Figure 11: Time Paths of the Responsiveness Index - High EIS













































Lumpy - High EIS
FL
5.2 Nonlinearities and Zero Maintenance
Let us now return to the EIS=1 model but lower the maintenance parameter. Thus we no longer
match the heteroscedasticity range in the data, but continue to match both sectoral and aggre-
gate investment volatilities. This conﬁguration implies that in order to match PE-smoothing
we need to increase the size of adjustment costs. Table 11 illustrates this trade-off: to keep
roughly the same magnitude of PE-smoothing (last three columns), adjustment costs decrease
as maintenance becomes more important. This mechanism holds for any level of the EIS.
The negative correlation between adjustment costs and maintenance follows from the fact
that a higher maintenance parameter lowers the effective drift of mandated investment (since
part of depreciation is undone in each period). This is important in these models, as it implies
that the cross-section distributions of mandated investment are far from the Caplin-Spulber
uniform limit, and hence there is plenty of space for them to vary over time in response to
shocks. Bycontrast,withoutmaintenancethedriftdominatesovermicroeconomicuncertainty
27shocks and the cross section of mandated investment is closer to the Caplin and Spulber ex-
treme where there is no PE-smoothing.25
Table 11: THE IMPACT OF MAINTENANCE
Model Adj. costs Adj. costs PE/total smoothing
Unit Output Unit Wage Bill Lower bd. Upper bd. Avge.
EIS=1, 0% maint.: 97.08% 151.69% 14.5% 80.9% 47.7%
EIS=1,25% maint.: 33.02% 51.59% 15.4% 80.9% 48.2%
EIS=1 50% maint.: 9.53% 14.88% 15.4% 81.0% 48.2%
The same reasoning explains why the volatility of the impulse response function increases
withthe maintenance parameter. Anincrease inthe latterallowsfor larger countercyclical ﬂuc-
tuations in the degree of PE-smoothing, which exacerbates the magnitude of the response of
aggregate investment to shocks in the face of an unusually long string of positive aggregate
shocks.
Figure 12: Time Paths of the Responsiveness Index - No Maintenance













































Lumpy - Zero Maintenance
FL
The main conclusion for this subsection, however, is shown in ﬁgure 12. Even with zero
maintenance the responsiveness index of the lumpy economy varies by 30% between trough
and peak (from 0.0185 to 0.0241).
25The Caplin-Spulber model is the only Ss model where the impulse response functions do not vary over time,
see Caballero and Engel (2007) for details.
286 Final Remarks
We have shown that adding realistic lumpy capital adjustment at the microeconomic level to
an otherwise standard RBC model has important macroeconomic implications. In particular,
the extended model is able to match the fact that the impulse response functions of aggregate
investment, conditional on the history of shocks, varies considerably over time in US data.
The reason for this success is that, relative to the standard RBC model, in the lumpy model
investment booms feed into themselves and lead to signiﬁcantly larger capital accumulation
following a string of positive shocks. Busts, on the other hand, can lead to protracted periods of
depressed investment, which are largely unresponsive to positive shocks.
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31A Parameter Appendix
The following table 12 summarizes the common parameters of the models explored in the pa-
per:
Table 12: COMMON PARAMETERS
Calibration ½A ½S Æ½I ¾S ¾I ± ° ¯ µ º
Quarterly 0.9500 0.8612 0.0273 0.0472 0.0220 1.0040 0.9942 0.1800 0.6400
Yearly 0.8145 0.5500 0.0501 0.0865 0.0880 1.0160 0.9770 0.1800 0.6400
Persistence parameters have the following relation between quarterly and annually: ½q Æ
½0.25





. For ½S and ¾S the yearly parameters are primitive because of the merely annual




I Æ 0.1. Finally, the
production function for quarterly output is one fourth of the one for yearly output.
The calibration of the other parameters, ¾A,Â, ¯ » and A is explained in Section 3. When we
refer in the main text to a quarterly calibration (our benchmark models), then we use – given
the quarterly parameters in the table above – ¾A and ¯ » to match jointly the standard deviation
of the quarterly aggregate investment rate (see Appendix B below) and the standard deviation
of the yearly sectoral investment rate, which is aggregated up over four quarters in the sectoral
simulations (we do not have quarterly sectoral data). This amounts to ¾A Æ0.0080 for the base-
line lumpy model and ¾A Æ 0.0051 for its frictionless counterpart. For the EIS=2 case we use
¾A Æ 0.0071. When we refer to a yearly calibration, then we use – given the yearly parameters
in the table above – ¾A and ¯ » to match jointly the standard deviation of the yearly aggregate
investment rate (see Appendix B below) and the standard deviation of the yearly sectoral in-
vestment rate. This amounts to ¾A Æ 0.0186 for the baseline lumpy model and ¾A Æ 0.0120
for its frictionless counterpart. The parameter that governs conditional heteroscedasticity, Â, is
calibrated only for the quarterly speciﬁcations, because we estimate conditional heteroscedas-
ticity on quarterly aggregate data to have enough data points to detect possible nonlinearities.
The use of the EIS as a calibration object is explored in Section 5.1, but the basic principle is the
same as with the ¾A-calibration.
32B Data Appendix
B.1 Aggregate Data
Since they are not readily available from standard sources, we construct quarterly and yearly
series of the aggregate investment rate, based on investment data from the national account
and ﬁxed asset tables, available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Time horizon for






where the denominator is the capital stock at the end of period t¡1, deﬂated by the investment
price index of t ¡1, and the numerator is investment in period t, deﬂated by period t prices.
Forannualinvestmentratesweusetheinvestmentandcapitaldatathatarereadilyavailable
from the BEA. The investment data is private ﬁxed nonresidential investment at historical costs
from ﬁxed asset table 1.5, line 4 (this includes equipment and structures). The capital data
(in current costs, end-of-year estimates) are from table 1.1., line 4 of the ﬁxed asset table. The
investment price index is from NIPA table 1.1.9, line 8.
For quarterly investment rates, we have to compute quarterly capital stocks, which are not
readily available. We use the following identity:
Kt ÆKt¡1(1Å¼I
t)ÅIt ¡Dt,
where all variables are nominal, ¼I
t denotes the investment price inﬂation rate from period t¡1
to period t, and Dt depreciation in period t. Again, depreciation data are only available on an













With these two equations quarterly aggregate investment rates can be computed, using NIPA
tables 1.1.5 and 1.1.9, line 8, for investment and investment price data, respectively, and ﬁxed
asset price tables 1.1. and 1.3., line 4, for capital stocks and depreciations, respectively. For
fourthquartercapitalstocks, weactuallyusetheannualend-of-yeardata. Thequarterlyinvest-
ment series is available on the authors’ websites. As Figure 13 shows (the vertical lines denote
NBERbusinesscycledates),theaggregateinvestmentratedoesnotappeartoexhibitanytrend,
which is why we do not ﬁlter any statistics related to it (both for real and simulated data).
33Figure 13: The Quarterly Aggregate Investment Rate







The following table 13 summarizes statistics of the aggregate investment rate:26
Table 13: AGGREGATE INVESTMENT RATE
Mean STD Persistence Max Min
Quarterly 0.026 0.0023 0.96 0.031 0.022
Yearly 0.104 0.0098 0.73 0.125 0.086
B.2 Sectoral Data
For lack of sectoral data outside of manufacturing, the data source here is the NBER manufac-
turing data set, publicly available on the NBER website. It contains yearly 4-digit industry data
for the manufacturing sector, according to the SIC-87 classiﬁcation. We look at the years 1960-
1996, later years are not available. We take out industry 3292, the asbestos products, because
this sector essentially dies out in the nineties. This leaves us with 458 industries altogether.
Sincethesectoralmodelanalysishasto(a)beisolatedfromgeneralequilibriumeffects, and
(b)containalargenumberofproductionunits,wetakethe3-digitlevelasthebestcompromise
aggregation level. This leaves us with 140 industries. Hence, we sum employment levels, real
capital, nominal investment and nominal value added onto the 3-digit level. The deﬂator for
26The maxima are achieved in II/00 (2000), respectively, the minima in I/61 (1975).
34investment is aggregated by a weighted sum (weighted by investment). Value added is deﬂated
by the GDP deﬂator instead of the sectoral deﬂators for shipments (the data do not contain
separate deﬂators for value added). We do this, because our model does not allow for relative
price movements between sectors, so by deﬂating sectoral value added with the GDP deﬂator
the resulting Solow residual is essentially a composite of true changes in sectoral technology
and relative price movements. Since value added and deﬂators are negatively correlated, we
would otherwise overestimate the volatility of sectoral innovations.27
TFP-Calculation: Since our model is about value added production as opposed to output
production—wedonotmodelutilizationofmaterialsandenergy—wedonotusetheTFP-series
in the data set, which are based on a production function for output. Rather, we use a produc-
tion function for real value added in employment and real capital with payroll as a fraction of
valueaddedastheemploymentshare,andtheresidualascapitalshare,andperformastandard
Solow residual calculation for each industry separately.
Next, in order to extract the residual industry-speciﬁc and uncorrelated-with-the-aggregate
component for each industry, we regress each industry time series of logged Solow residuals on
the time series of the value added-weighted cross-sectional average of logged Solow residuals
and a constant. Since the residuals of this regression still contain sector-speciﬁc effects, but our
model features ex-ante homogenous sectors, we take out a deterministic quadratic trend on
theseresidualsforeachsector.28 Theresidualsofthistrendregressionarethentakenasthepure
sectoral Solow residual series. By construction, they are uncorrelated with the cross-sectional
averageseries. WethenestimateanAR(1)-speciﬁcationforeachoftheseseries,andset¾S equal
tothevalue-added-weightedaverageoftheestimatedstandarddeviationsofthecorresponding
innovations, which results in ¾S Æ0.0501, and ½S equal to the value-added-weighted average of
the estimated ﬁrst-order autocorrelation, which leads to ½S Æ0.55.
Sincethiscomputationissubjecttosubstantialmeasurementerrorandsomewhatarbitrary
choices,weperformanumberofrobustnesschecks: 1)Weﬁxtheemploymentshareandcapital
share to º Æ 0.64 and µ Æ 0.18, as in our model parametrization for all industries. 2) Instead of
usinganOLSprojectionontothecross-sectionalmean,wesimplysubtractthelatter. 3)Welook
atunweightedmeans. 4)Welookatmediansinsteadofmeans,againweightedandunweighted.
The resulting numbers remain in the ballpark of the parameters we use.
27Indeed, using a weighted sum of 4-digit level value added deﬂators instead of the GDP deﬂator would increase
the standard deviation of the sectoral shock innovation from the 0.0501 we are using to 0.0564 and the persistence
of sectoral technology from 0.55 to 0.61, other things being equal. We thank Julia Thomas for this suggestion.
28Linear trends are ﬂat, as the regression on the manufacturing average takes essentially care of the linear com-
ponent. Not de-trending the sectors would increase both persistence and the standard deviation of the sectoral
shock innovation from 0.55 to 0.65, and from 0.0501 to 0.0518, respectively. We thank Pete Klenow for this sugges-
tion.
35Calculation of I/K-Moments: To extract a pure sectoral component of the time series of the
industry investment rate, which like the aggregate data includes equipment and structures, we
perform the same regressions that were used for TFP-calculation, except that we use a deter-
ministic linear trend to extract sector speciﬁc effects. We do not log or ﬁlter the investment
rate series. The common component we regress the sectoral investment rate series on is now
a capital-weighted average of the industry investment rates. Again, we perform robustness
checks with fairly stable results. The resulting standard deviation of sectoral investment rates –
our target of calibration – is 0.0163.29
C Conditional Heteroscedasticity in the Aggregate Investment
Rate
In this appendix we ﬁrst present evidence for conditional heteroscedasticity in aggregate U.S.
investment to capital ratios. Then we explain how we calibrated the maintenance parameter
using this feature of the data.
C.1 Conditional Heteroscedasticity in Aggregate U.S. Investment
Denote the (demeaned) private ﬁxed nonresidential investment to capital ratio series by xt. We
work with the 1960.I–2005.IV period and estimate the following time-series model to quantify
the extent to which this series exhibit conditional heteroscedasticity:30
xt ÆÁxt¡1Å¾tet, (17a)
¾t Æ®0Å®1 ¯ xk
t¡1, (17b)
where ¯ xk








and the et are i.i.d. with zero mean and variance equal to one. Of course, the ﬁrst element of
the impulse response of xt to et-shocks is equal to ¾t, thereby illustrating the close connection
between conditional heteroscedasticity and time-varying impulse response functions.
29Their persistence is 0.55.
30®0 and ®1 must satisfy conditions that ensure that ¾t deﬁned below is positive for all t. For example, a well
know result in the ARCH literatrue is that for k Æ1 this condition is Á2Å®2
1 Ç1.
36The models with lumpy adjustment developed in this paper (and earlier models such as
Caballero and Engel (1999)) predict that ﬁtting the above time-series model to aggregate in-
vestment data will lead to a positive and economically signiﬁcant value for the parameter ®1.
The reason is that in these models the cross-section of mandated investment concentrates in
a region with a steeper likelihood of adjusting when recent investment has been high, which
implies that investment becomes more responsive to shocks during these times.
To estimate the parameters of the time-series model (17a)-(17b), we ﬁrst regress xt on its
laggedvalueandthenregresstheabsoluteresidualfromthisregression, denotedby jˆ etjinwhat
follows, on ¯ xk
t¡1 (both regressions are estimated via OLS).31 The second regression then looks
like
jˆ etjÆ ˆ ®0Å ˆ ®1 ¯ xk
t¡1Åerror,
and provides estimates for ®0 and ®1.
Table 14 presents the estimates we obtain for values of k ranging from 1 to 7. The standard
deviations are calculated based on 10,000 bootstrap simulations and reported in parentheses.
Since the bootstrap simulations generate a signiﬁcant fraction of large estimates for the param-
eter that captures conditional heteroscedasticity, ®1, leading to a standard deviation that over-
states the case against ®1 being positive, we also report the fraction of bootstrap simulations
that generate a negative estimate for ®1. This fraction is the p-value for rejecting the one-sided
hypothesis ®1 È 0. For six out of the seven values of k we consider, this p-value is below the
classic 5% threshold, in three cases it is below 2%. More important, the estimated conditional
heteroscedasticity schedule (17b) implies economically signiﬁcant variations in ¾t over time.
Thus, for example, the ratio of the largest and smallest values for ¾t when k Æ1 is 1.49.
Table 14: CONDITIONAL HETEROSCEDASTICITY IN U.S. (1960.I–2005.IV) I/K SERIES
k
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Á: 0.9599 0.9599 0.9599 0.9599 0.9599 0.9599 0.9599
(0.0299) (0.0300) (0.0298) (0.0302) (0.0300) (0.0295) (0.0296)
103£®0: 0.4828 0.4849 0.4823 0.4822 0.4805 0.4820 0.4837
(0.0351) (0.0353) (0.0355) (0.0363) (0.0386) (0.0390) (0.0397)
®1: 0.0209 0.0239 0.0282 0.0300 0.0330 0.0336 0.0331
(0.0172) (0.0173) (0.0172) (0.0174) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0182)
p-value (®1 È0): 0.0507 0.0369 0.0222 0.0179 0.0170 0.0189 0.0210
No. obs. 1st regr.: 183 183 183 183 183 183 183
No. obs. 2nd regr.: 183 182 181 180 179 178 177
31To limit the inﬂuence of outliers on our estimates, we work with the absolute residual instead of the squared
residual. The estimates we obtain are essentially the same if we work with the squared residuals.
37The time series model (17a)-(17b) is a particularly simple and robust approach to test for
the presence of conditional heteroscedasticity. More sophisticated options can be used as well.
For example, instead of assuming the linear relation (17b) we could allow for a more general
expression of the form ¾t Æ h(¯ xk
t¡1), where h is a smooth increasing function. Figure 1 in the
introduction plots the estimate we obtain for h (normalized by the average ﬁtted value for ¾t)
using k Æ5,32 a Gaussian kernel and cross-validation to determine the appropriate bandwidth.
C.2 Calibrating the Maintenance Parameter
To choose parameter values that match the heteroscedasticity present in aggregate U.S. invest-
ment series, it is useful to summarize the estimated conditional heteroscedasticity schedule
(17b) by one statistic. We do this via the signed log-ratio statistic, which we refer to as the het-
eroscedasticity range. We calculate this statistic as follows: The absolute value of this statistic is
the log-ratio of the largest and smallest ﬁtted values for the conditional heteroscedasticity re-
gression (17b), when k Æ 1. The sign of the statistic is positive if the estimated slope is positive
and negative otherwise. In this way we obtain one statistic that captures, simultaneously, the
magnitude and sign of heteroscedastic behavior in lumpy adjustment models.
Table 15 reports estimates for the ﬁrst moment of the range statistic for the models we con-
sider throughout the paper. For each parameter conﬁguration we generate a time-series of ag-
gregate investment to capital ratios of the same length as the U.S. investment series we work
with in the preceding subsection. We then estimate the range statistic for this series (we sim-
ulated a sequence of 10,000 observations for each parameter conﬁguration, which leads to 54
series of length 184).
TheﬁrstrowinTable15reportstherangestatisticsforthemainmodeldiscussedinsections
3.2 and 4, that is, the model where we impose an EIS of 1. The ﬁrst column reports the value
for the range statistic in the actual U.S. investment series. The second column reports the value
for a model where capital can be adjusted at no cost. Columns 3 through 9 consider various
values for the maintenance parameter, in each case the simulated model matches perfectly
the volatility of sectoral and aggregate investment. It follows from the ﬁrst row that our models
withlumpyadjustmentmatchtheconditionalheteroscedasticityintheactualdatamuchbetter
thanafrictionlessmodel. Italsofollowsfromtheﬁrstrowthatamaintenanceparameterof0.50
generates a ﬁrst moment of 0.4008 for the range statistic, which is close to the estimated value
of 0.3971. We therefore choose ÂÆ0.50 in this case.
The second row reports a similar exercise when the value of the EIS is set to 2 instead of
1. This time Â Æ 0.40 provides the best ﬁt among the values of the maintenance parameter we
32Which corresponds to the lowest p-value in Table 14.
38consider. Finally, the third row considers the calibration strategy followed in Section 5.1, where
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is among the parameters used to match the selected
data moments. In this case the best match of the range statistic is provided by the model with
ÂÆ0.25.
Table 15: HETEROSCEDASTICITY RANGE. CASE: EIS=1
Â
U.S. I/K frictionless 0 0.10 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.40 0.50
EIS = 1: 0.3971 0.0767 0.2527 0.2722 0.2945 0.3072 0.3215 0.3573 0.4008
EIS = 2: 0.3971 0.0767 0.2745 0.2940 0.3183 0.3330 0.3493 0.3896 0.4409
EIS-estimated: 0.3971 0.0767 0.3203 0.3494 0.3812 0.3998 0.4257 0.4803 0.5532
D Numerical Appendix
In this appendix, we describe in detail the numerical implementation of the model computa-
tion. Unless otherwise stated, the numerical speciﬁcations refer to the baseline calibration in
the main text, although most of them are common across all models.
D.1 Decision Problem
Given the assumptions we made in the main paper: 1) ½S Æ ½I Æ ½, and 2) approximating the
distribution ¹ by the aggregate capital stock, ¯ k, the dynamic programming problem has a 4-
dimensional state space: (k, ¯ k,z,²). Since the employment problem has an analytical solution,
there is essentially just one continuous control, k0. We discretize the state space as follows:
1. k: nk Æ35 grid points from [0,7.5], with a lower grid width at low capital levels, where the
curvature of the value function is highest.
2. ¯ k : n¯ k Æ13 grid points in [0.8,1.4], equi-spaced.
3. z : nz Æ 11 grid points in [0.92,1.08] with closer grid points around unity. For the Gauss-
Hermitian integration (see Judd, 1998) we use 7 integration nodes.




1¡½2, the unconditional variance of the combined technology process. For the
transition matrix we use the procedure proposed in Tauchen (1986).
39We note that for all partial equilibrium computations the dimension of the state space col-
lapses to three, ¯ k is no longer needed to compute prices and aggregate movements. Instead,
we follow KT in ﬁxing the intertemporal price and the real wage at their average levels from the
general equilibrium simulations.
Since we allow for a continuous control, k, and ¯ k and z can take on any value continuously,
we can only compute the value function exactly at the grid points above and interpolate for
in-between values. This is done by using a multidimensional cubic splines procedure, with a
so-called “not-a-knot”-condition to address the large number of degrees of freedom problem,
when using splines (see Judd, 1998). We compute the solution by value function iteration, us-
ing 20 steps of policy improvement after each actual optimization procedure. The optimum is
found by using a golden section search. Upon convergence, we check single-peakedness of the
objective function, to guarantee that the golden section search is reasonable.
D.2 Equilibrium Simulation
For the calibration of the general equilibrium models we draw one random series for the aggre-
gate technology level and ﬁx it across models. We use T Æ 600 and discard the ﬁrst 100 obser-
vations. For computing the conditional heteroscedasticity in the model simulations we use a
muchlongersimulationhorizonofT Æ10000. Weﬁndthat,generally,thestatisticsarerobustto
T. We start from an arbitrary individual capital distribution and the stationary distribution for
the combined productivity level. The model economies typically settle fast into their stochastic
steady state after roughly 50 observations. Since with idiosyncratic shocks, adjustment costs
and necessary maintenance some production unit may not adjust for a very long time, we take
out any individual capital stock in the distribution that has a marginal weight below 10¡10, in
order to save on memory. We re-scale the remaining distribution proportionally.
As in the production unit’s decision problem, we use a golden section search to ﬁnd the
optimal target capital level, given p. We ﬁnd the market clearing intertemporal price, using a
combination of bisection, secant and inverse quadratic interpolation methods. Precision of the
market-clearing outcome is better than 10¡7.
To further assess the quality of the assumed log-linear equilibrium rules, we perform the
following simulation: for each point in the T Æ 500 (we discard the ﬁrst 100 observations) time
series, we iterate for a time series of ˜ T Æ 100 aggregate capital and the intertemporal price for-
ward, using only the equilibrium rules and assuming the actual time path for aggregate tech-
nology. We then compare the aggregate capital and p after ˜ T steps with the actually simulated
ones, when the equilibrium price was updated at each step. We then compute maximum abso-
lute percentage deviations, mean squared percentage deviations, and the correlation between
40Table 16: Assessing agents’ forecasting rules for capital
FL Baseline Baseline-SKEW High-EIS High-EIS-SKEW
a¯ k 0.0065 0.0021 0.0112 0.0013 0.0150
b¯ k 0.9061 0.9473 0.9388 0.9457 0.9299
c¯ k 0.2199 0.1184 0.1106 0.1925 0.1744
d¯ k NaN NaN 0.0075 NaN 0.0164
e ¯ k NaN NaN -0.0008 NaN -0.0020
R2 1.0000 0.9999 1.0000 0.9999 1.0000
SE 0.0000 0.003 0.0001 0.0004 0.0002
MAD(%) 0.09 0.61 0.34 0.92 0.37
MSE(%) 0.04 0.30 0.14 0.47 0.14
Correl. 1.0000 0.9956 0.9992 0.9897 0.9992
Table 17: Assessing agents’ forecasting rules for p
FL Baseline Baseline-SKEW High-EIS High-EIS-SKEW
ap 1.8438 1.8489 1.8748 0.0930 0.0992
bp -0.3357 -0.2442 -0.2701 -0.0350 -0.0423
cp -0.5836 -0.8020 -0.8215 -0.0880 -0.0956
dp NaN NaN 0.0213 NaN 0.0074
ep NaN NaN -0.0031 NaN -0.0010
R2 1.000 0.9992 0.9999 0.9944 0.9998
SE 0.0000 0.0006 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000
MAD(%) 0.02 0.19 0.11 0.04 0.01
MSE(%) 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.00
Correl. 1.000 0.9997 0.9999 0.9980 0.9998
the simulated values and the out-of-sample forecasts. Tables 16 and 17 summarize the numer-
ical results for each model. The rows contain: the coefﬁcients of the log-linear regression, its R2
and standard error and the three above measures that assess the out-of-sample quality of the
equilibriumrules. Theyassessthelog-linearapproximationforfuturecapitalandcurrent p, re-
spectively. Baseline-SKEW refers to our baseline calibration, where agents use additionally the
log standard deviation and skewness of the capital distribution for forecasting, and High-EIS-
SKEW does the same for our high EIS=20 calibration with a maintenance parameter of ÂÆ0.25.
Table 16 shows that there exists a good log-linear approximation for aggregate capital as a
function of last period’s capital and the current aggregate shock. This may seem surprising in
light of the time-varying impulse response functions we described in the main text. However,
the numbers also show that in particular out-of-sample forecasts improve, when higher mo-
ments of the capital distribution are introduced, in particular for the high EIS calibration. Fur-
41thermore, as we argue next, the goodness-of-ﬁt for an equation analogous to (11a) and (11b),
but with the aggregate investment rate as the dependent variable, is less good, even though the
poorer ﬁt has no bearing on aggregate investment dynamics.
Table 18: Assessing agents’ forecasting rules for I/K
Highest moment R2 Autocorrelation
all 1st quart. 2nd quart. 3rd quart 4th quart. average 1st 2nd
Baseline
Mean: 0.9896 0.9535 0.7859 0.7259 0.9501 0.8538 0.906 0.816
St. deviation: 0.9992 0.9947 0.9869 0.9822 0.9961 0.9900 0.922 0.846
Skewness: 0.9998 0.9986 0.9975 0.9978 0.9988 0.9982 0.919 0.841
High EIS
Mean: 0.9759 0.9007 0.5374 0.2470 0.8831 0.6421 0.904 0.813
St. deviation: 0.9979 0.9882 0.9705 0.9436 0.9901 0.9731 0.928 0.857
Skewness: 0.9998 0.9988 0.9976 0.9963 0.9991 0.9979 0.923 0.849
We simulated a series of 500 observations for our baseline model and the high EIS calibra-
tion, assuming that agents use the ﬁrst, the ﬁrst two and the ﬁrst three moments of capital
in their forecasting rules.33 We divided the simulated series into quartiles based on the mag-
nitude of the actual investment rate, and calculated, for each quartile, the R2-goodness-of-ﬁt
statistic between the aggregate investment rate series implied by the forecasting rule and the
“true”aggregate investment rate series, which we assume to be the one generated, when agents
use three moments of the capital distribution for forecasting.
Table 18 shows our results. The average (across quartiles) R2 betweenthe log-linear approx-
imationandthetrueinvestmentrateisonly0.85forthebaselinemodeland0.64forthehighEIS
model. Thisaverageincreasesto0.99(0.97)whenthelog-standard-deviationofcapitalisadded
as a regressor, and to well above 0.99 when the skewness statistic is included as well.34 The last
two columns of Table 18 show that the estimated ﬁrst and second order autocorrelations of the
investment rate also improve signiﬁcantly when using higher moments in the forecasting rules:
the corresponding values for the actual investment rate series are 0.919 and 0.842, respectively,
for the baseline calibration, and 0.923 and 0.850, respectively, for the high EIS calibration.
We also recomputed the aggregate evolution of the aggregate investment rate, when agents
use the rules that include higher moments of capital, and found no discernible differences
with what we obtained with the log-linear forecasting rules: the correlation coefﬁcient between
33More precisely, the ﬁrst case has the log-mean of capital holdings as a regressor, the second case adds the
log-standard deviation and the third case also incorporates the skewness of capital holdings. Of course, logzt is a
regressor in all cases.
34Forthefrictionlessmodeltheﬁrstpartoftheﬁrstrowwouldread: 0.9981,0.9887,0.9774,0.9796,0.9841,0.9825.
And the autocorrelations for forecasted investment rates are almost identical to the ones for the actual series.
42the sample paths of I/K generated with forecasting rules with and without higher moments is
above 0.9999.35
D.3 Sectoral Simulation
Underlying the sectoral simulation are four assumptions: ﬁrst, a large enough number of sec-
tors and, secondly, that ¾S is large enough relative to ¾A, so that we can compute the sectoral
implications of our model independently of the aggregate general equilibrium calculations.
This is also reﬂected in our treatment of the sectoral data as residual values, which are uncorre-
lated with aggregate components. Thirdly, we make use of the assumption that a sector is large
enoughtocomprisealargenumberofproductionunitsbyinvokingalawoflargenumbersnow
for the true idiosyncratic productivity. Finally, ½S Æ ½I, and the independence of sectoral and
the idiosyncratic productivity, so that we can treat sectoral and truly idiosyncratic uncertainty
as one state variable in the general equilibrium problem.
We start by ﬁxing the aggregate technology level at its average level: zSS Æ1. The converged
equilibrium law of motion for aggregate capital can then be used to compute the steady state
aggregate capital level that belongs to this aggregate productivity. It is the ﬁxed point of the





This, in turn, leads to the steady state pSS ´exp(ap Åbp log(¯ kSS)).
Thenwespecifyaseparategridforidiosyncraticandsectoralproductivityinsuchawaythat
all new grid points and any product of them will lie on the original 19-state grid for the com-
bined productivity, used in the general equilibrium problem. Given the equi-spaced (in logs)
nature of the combined grid this is obviously possible. Thus, the idiosyncratic grid comprises
11 grid points, and the sectoral grid 9 grid points, both equi-spaced and centered around unity.
We then recompute optimal target capital levels as well as gross values of investment (see
equation 12d) at zSS, ¯ kSS, at the 19 values for ². By construction, these are then also the values
for any (²S,²I)-combination. Note that we use the value functions computed from the gen-
eral equilibrium case. We draw a random series of T Æ 2600 for ²S, which remains ﬁxed across
all models, start from an arbitrary capital distribution and the stationary distribution for the
35Based on this result, when computing the R2 mentioned in the preceding paragraph, we used the actual series
that results when agents use the ﬁrst three moments of capital as the “true”series. There are no signiﬁcant differ-
ences in Table 18, if we use the actual series that results when agents only use the ﬁrst, or the ﬁrst two moments.
43idiosyncratic technology level, and follow the behavior of this representative sector, using the
sectoral policy rules. The details are similar to those of the equilibrium simulation.
Finally, we test the two main assumptions on which we base our sectoral computations:
a continuum of sectors and ﬁxing the aggregate environment at its steady state level. To this
end, we compute the equilibrium with a ﬁnite number of sectors, NS. Also, we introduce an
additional state-variable, given by: ¯ ²S,t ´
P
iÆ1,...,NS log(²S,t(i)), which captures changes in the
aggregate environment, beyond the common aggregate shock. Obviously, ¯ ²S,t Æ0,8 t, as NS !
1, bythelawoflargenumbersandassumingsectoralindependence. Thisadditionalaggregate
state is then integrated over by Gauss-Hermitian integration, which is facilitated by the fact
that the ¯ ²S,t-process is independent of the aggregate technology process (by assumption). For
computational reasons - following a large number of sectors with a large number of production
units each is considerably more onerous in a quarterly calibration than in a yearly calibration -,
we run these robustness checks for the annual equivalents of our baseline models.
We choose two different values for NS. First, 400, which roughly equals the number of 3-
digit SIC-87 sectors in the US (395). Since, however, sectors are of very different size and overall
importance, and also often correlated, we decrease, secondly, NS to 100 for robustness reasons.
The resulting residual ¾¯ ²S is 0.0026 and 0.0052, respectively. Notice that in both cases ¾¯ ²S is
considerably smaller than ¾A Æ0.0120, the ¾A for the annual frictionless calibration, so that we
should not expect too large an effect from this additional source of aggregate uncertainty.
Of course, in order to make the computation viable, we have to scale down the numerical
speciﬁcation of the computation, in particular the grid lengths. The grid length for the addi-
tional aggregate shock is 7, equi-spaced, between [¡0.03,0.03] for NS Æ100, and [¡0.015,0.015]
for NS Æ 400. We use 5 nodes for both continuous aggregate shocks in the Gauss Hermitian
integration.
The following table shows the aggregate and sectoral standard deviations for annual invest-
ment rates for the frictionless model and our baseline lumpy model (Â Æ 0.5). The raw sectoral
standard deviations are shown as a capital-weighted average (the unweighted averages are only
insigniﬁcantly different). The residual sectoral standard deviations are shown with the same
ﬁltering operations as discussed in Appendix B.2.
The ﬁrst important observation is that the numbers obtained here are not much different
from what we have obtained in the simpliﬁed computation, which is in particular true for the
lumpy model. Speciﬁcally, the frictionless model continues to fail to match observed sectoral
volatility by an order of magnitude. And, secondly, the numbers deviate in the expected direc-
tion: the aggregate standard deviation increases (from 0.0098), because there is an additional
aggregate shock, but only slightly so; the sectoral standard deviations decrease a little bit (from
44Table 19: ROBUSTNESS OF THE SECTORAL COMPUTATION
Model: FL FL Lumpy Lumpy
Number of sectors: 100 400 100 400
Aggr. St.dev. 0.0113 0.0102 0.0103 0.0099
Sect. St.dev. - raw 0.1824 0.1838 0.0190 0.0188
Sect. St.dev. - res. 0.1819 0.1834 0.0159 0.0160
0.0163), becausenowgeneralequilibriumforcescontributealsotosectoralsmoothing. Overall,
our simpliﬁed sectoral simulations seem justiﬁed.
E Matching Establishment Statistics
One argument we used to justify the use of sectoral rather than plant level data to calibrate mi-
crofrictions,isthattherearemanydeterminantsofplantlevelmomentswhicharelessrelevant
for the macro dimensions we are concerned with. In this appendix we provide support to this
claim by showing that minor modiﬁcations of the micro underpinnings of the model we pre-
sented inthe main text canlead to a satisfactory match of establishment level moments as well.
More importantly, the match of sectoral and aggregate moments we obtained in the main text
are unaffected by the extension we develop next.
E.1 A Simple Extension
A ﬁrst choice we need to make when matching the model to micro data is to decide how many
micro units in the model correspond to one establishment. Choices by other authors have cov-
ered a wide range, going from one to a number large enough—sometimes a continuum—so
that adding additional units makes no difference.36
Two additional issues arise if we choose to model an establishment as the aggregation of
many micro units. First, we must address the extent to which shocks—both to productivity and
to adjustment costs—are correlated across units within an establishment.37 Second, we must
take a stance on the fact that establishments sell off and buy what in our model corresponds to
one or more micro units.
36Cooper and Haltiwanger (2005) and KT are examples of the former; Abel and Eberly (2002) and Bloom (2007)
of the latter.
37For tractability, all models assume that decisions are made at the micro-unit level, not the establishment level.
45Next we present a simple model that incorporates both elements mentioned above. The
economy is composed of sectors (indexed by s), which are composed of establishments (in-
dexed by e), which are composed of units (indexed by u). The log-productivity shock faced by
unit u in establishment e in sector s at time t is decomposed into aggregate, sectoral, establish-







t s AR(1;½A,¾A), log"S
st s AR(1;½S,¾S), log"F
est s AR(1;½E,¾E) and log"U
uest s
AR(1;½U,¾U).38,39 Consistent with the assumptions we made in the paper, we assume ½S Æ
½E Æ½U and denote the common value by ½.
An establishment is composed of a large number (continuum) of units. The extent to which
the behavior of units within an establishment is correlated will depend on the relative impor-
tance of ¾U and ¾E. The larger ¾E, the larger the correlation of productivity shocks across units
within an establishment and the more coordinated their investment decisions will be. We con-
sider two extreme scenarios for the degree of correlation of adjustment cost shocks across units
within an establishment: perfect correlation and independence.





are doing in this extension is grouping micro units into groups we call “establishments”, which
has no implication for sectoral aggregates. We therefore can decompose ¾2
I into the sum of
¾2
U and ¾2
E as we please, without affecting sectoral and aggregate statistics. We deﬁne ³ 2 [0,1]
via ¾2
U Æ ³¾2
I, so that ¾2
E Æ (1¡³)¾2
I. Productivity shocks are the same across units within an
establishment when ³Æ0, their correlation decreases as ³ increases.
Regarding the sale and purchase of micro units, we assume that in every period an es-
tablishment with capital Kest suffers a sales/purchase shock ¿est, so that its capital becomes
(1Å¿est)Kest. The ¿’s are i.i.d. draws from a zero mean symmetric distribution with standard
deviation¾¿. Weconsidertwopossibilities, astandardnormaldistributionanda t-distribution
with one degree of freedom. Since the sectors in our model are composed of a continuum
of establishments, our choice of a distribution with zero mean for purchase/sales shocks en-
sures that sectoral and aggregate statistics are unaffected by this extension as well. We choose
a symmetric distribution so that asymmetries in the histogram of investment rates cannot be
38xt s AR(1;½,¾) means that the process xt follows an AR(1) with ﬁrst order autocorrelation ½ and standard
deviation of innovations equal to ¾.
39Sectoral innovations are independent across sectors and independent from the innovations of the aggregate
shock. Establishment level innovations are independent across establishments and independent from the innova-
tions of the aggregate and sectoral shocks. Finally, unit level innovations are independent across units and inde-
pendent from the innovations of the aggregate, sectoral and establishment-level shocks.
46attributed to this choice.
We denote by ˜ iest the investment rate for a given establishment according to our model,
and by iest the corresponding investment rate recorded by the LRD. The latter differs from the
formerinthatitincludesthesale/purchaseofunitsfromotherestablishments,whichisignored
in our original model. We then have:
iest Æ(1¡¿est)˜ iest ¡¿est(1¡±). (18)
Summing up, our (admittedly simple) extension introduces two parameters over which we
can optimize to ﬁt establishment level moments without affecting the match of sectoral and
aggregate statistics. These parameters are the degree to which productivity shocks are corre-
lated across units within an establishment, and the average magnitude of sales and purchases
of micro units across establishments.
E.2 Matching Establishment Level Statistics
We work with Â Æ 0.5. For a ﬁxed value of ³, we generate a histogram with 2,500 realizations of
establishment level I/K using our model.40
Denote by fi, i Æ 1,...,5 the fraction of LRD establishments that adjusted less than ¡20%,
between ¡20 and ¡1%, between ¡1% and 1%, between 1 and 20% and above 20%, respec-
tively. And denote by ¼i(¾¿) the fraction of units with adjustment in the previous bins af-
ter applying the transformation described in (18). We choose the value of ¾¿ that minimizes
P
i jfi ¡¼i(¾¿)j/fi, that is, we minimize the absolute relative error.




of units (normal or t-distribution). As can be seen, our model does a reasonable job matching
the micro statistics which have been considered earlier in the literature. In fact, our ﬁt is within
the ballpark of the ﬁt obtained by KT. Also, even though we optimize over ³2[0,1], the statistics
we obtain vary relatively little with ³ (the maximum, over ³, average absolute deviation exceeds
the minimum value by more than 20% for only one of the eight cases considered).






E in the role of ¾2
I.
41Recall that f1, f2, f3, f4 and f5 represent the fraction of establishments with I/K less than ¡20%, between ¡20
and ¡1%, between ¡1 and 1%, between 1 and 20% and above 20%, respectively.
47Table 20: MATCHING LRD MOMENTS: NEW
Model f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 Avge. abs. dev.
Calib. corr. distr.
3 0 n .000 .090 .046 .729 .135 .3770
3 0 t .022 .040 .015 .833 .090 .4823
3 1 n .000 .090 .079 .726 .105 .3306
3 1 t .031 .081 .043 .696 .149 .3045
5 0 n .000 .090 .046 .728 .135 .3776
5 0 t .022 .040 .015 .833 .090 .4823
5 1 n .000 .094 .160 .655 .091 .5138
5 1 t .019 .088 .097 .684 .113 .1451
Data .019 .090 .082 .622 .187 .0000
KT .010 .165 .073 .567 .185 .3032
F The Responsiveness Index
Given an economy characterized by a distribution ¹t and aggregate productivity level zt we
denote the resulting aggregate investment rate by I





















where ¾A is the standard deviation of the aggregate innovation.





I Å(¹t,logzt) Å I ¡(¹t,logzt)
¤
. (19)
The factor (1¡µ ¡º) is included so that the index is approximately one when no sources of
smoothing are present. More precisely, in a static, partial equilibrium setting, with no time-to-




leading to the following optimal capital target level as a function of aggregate technology:
k¤ ÆCz1/(1¡µ¡º),
where C is a constant that depends on the wage and the technology parameters. Taking logs
42For notational simplicity we leave out idiosyncratic and sectoral shocks.





thereby justifying the normalization constant.
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